United States v. Squire: A Fifth Circuit Case Testing the Limits of Federal Gun Bans
In the summer of 2026, a relatively routine federal firearms prosecution in Louisiana transformed into one of the most closely watched challenges to congressional power in years. United States v. Squire, No. 25-30324, began as an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the federal felon-in-possession statute. By July, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had vacated the panel opinion and agreed to rehear the case en banc, reframing the dispute around the Commerce Clause. The case now asks a foundational question: Does Congress have the constitutional authority to criminalize simple possession of a firearm inside a private home merely because the gun once crossed a state line?
The outcome could affect not only 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) but the broader architecture of federal criminal law that rests on attenuated connections to interstate commerce.
The Underlying Facts
Curtis Squire’s case originated in New Orleans. On February 15, 2024, a shooting occurred in the city. Ten days later, New Orleans Police Department officers executed a search warrant at Squire’s residence based on allegations of his involvement. Officers recovered a Glock Model 23C .40-caliber pistol with a large-capacity magazine and twenty live rounds. Forensic testing later established that the recovered firearm was not linked to the shooting. Related state charges were dismissed.
Federal prosecutors, however, charged Squire under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Squire’s criminal history included prior Louisiana convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin, possession of a firearm in connection with a controlled substance, obstruction of justice, simple burglary, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. These prior offenses made him a prohibited person under federal law.
In January 2025, Squire pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, preserving his right to appeal constitutional challenges. The district court sentenced him to 52 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. In the factual basis for the plea, Squire admitted that the firearm and ammunition had previously traveled in interstate commerce and were manufactured outside Louisiana—the standard jurisdictional hook used in nearly every modern § 922(g) prosecution.
The Panel Decision: Dangerousness Over Location
Squire’s primary argument on appeal centered on the Second Amendment. Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024), he contended that permanently disarming him inside his own home violated the right to keep and bear arms. He argued that historical tradition did not support lifelong disarmament of individuals convicted of non-violent or non-dangerous offenses when the firearm was kept solely for self-defense at home.
On June 2, 2026, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit (Judges Clement, Southwick, and Engelhardt) rejected the challenge and affirmed the conviction. Writing for the panel, Judge Edith Brown Clement applied Bruen’s two-step framework. The court first acknowledged that the plain text of the Second Amendment covered Squire’s conduct, rendering it presumptively protected. At the second step, however, the government carried its burden by demonstrating a historical tradition of disarming classes of persons regarded as dangerous.
The panel emphasized that drug trafficking constitutes an “inherently dangerous activity.” Historical analogues—laws disarming those perceived as threats to public order, including certain political dissidents and religious minorities in earlier eras—supported categorical disarmament of convicted drug traffickers. Critically, the court rejected any special constitutional protection for possession inside the home when the predicate offense involved dangerousness. “The home-based distinction [Squire] attempts to draw within our Nation’s historical tradition is mugged by the reality that our historical laws support his disarmament, even in the special confines of his home,” the opinion stated.
The holding was expressly narrow. The panel did not decide whether Congress could disarm individuals based solely on non-dangerous felony convictions when the firearm remained inside the home. It affirmed only that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally reach a convicted drug trafficker under these circumstances.
From Second Amendment to Commerce Clause
After the panel decision, Squire petitioned for rehearing en banc. His lawyers largely set aside the Second Amendment arguments that the panel had rejected and instead pressed a facial challenge under the Commerce Clause. They argued that Congress lacks authority to criminalize purely local possession of a firearm simply because the gun once traveled in interstate commerce. Relying on United States v. Lopez (1995), which struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Squire contended that the attenuated “once crossed state lines” theory converts the Commerce Clause into a general police power reserved to the states.
This reframing gained sudden traction following a concurrence by Justice Clarence Thomas in United States v. Hemani, decided June 18, 2026. In Hemani, the Supreme Court unanimously held that § 922(g)(3)—the prohibition on firearm possession by unlawful drug users—violated the Second Amendment as applied to a habitual marijuana user with no showing of dangerousness. Justice Thomas joined the majority but wrote separately to question the Commerce Clause foundation of § 922(g) more broadly.
Thomas argued that the prevailing interpretation—allowing conviction whenever a firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce—exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers. “The Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to ‘regulate or ban possession of any item that has ever been offered for sale or crossed state lines,’” he wrote. Such an approach, he warned, would “convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.” He called on lower courts to reexamine the constitutionality of § 922(g) in an appropriate case.
Less than five weeks later, the Fifth Circuit answered that call.
The En Banc Order and a Sharp Dissent
On July 20, 2026, the full Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc by majority vote of the active judges. The short per curiam order vacated the June 2 panel opinion and directed the clerk to set a new briefing schedule and oral argument date. The case would proceed as a facial Commerce Clause challenge rather than the narrower Second Amendment dispute decided by the panel.
Judge Stephen A. Higginson dissented from the grant of rehearing. His opinion highlighted the dramatic shift in the case’s focus and the potential systemic consequences. “Today, we grant a petition for rehearing in what was a Second Amendment as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), now reframed as a facial Commerce Clause challenge,” he wrote. Higginson warned that the court was inviting a ruling with “untold consequences for federal law,” potentially reaching far beyond firearms statutes to other federal crimes predicated on similar commerce hooks—child pornography, explosives, biological agents, and a host of regulatory offenses.
He noted that § 922(g) contains an explicit interstate-commerce element, unlike the statute struck down in Lopez, and that Squire had admitted the jurisdictional facts. Higginson expressed concern that the Fifth Circuit was expanding Lopez in a manner that could destabilize large portions of the U.S. Code.
Broader Stakes for Federal Authority
United States v. Squire arrives at a moment of renewed judicial skepticism toward expansive readings of the Commerce Clause. For three decades, lower courts have uniformly upheld § 922(g) convictions based on the minimal “prior interstate travel” showing. That consensus rested on post-Lopez and Gonzales v. Raich (2005) doctrine treating even attenuated effects on interstate markets as sufficient.
If the Fifth Circuit accepts Squire’s argument, it would create a circuit split of the first order and almost certainly force Supreme Court review. A ruling limiting Congress’s power could require prosecutors to prove a more substantial contemporary connection to interstate commerce—something far harder to establish for a gun kept in a drawer at home. Such a decision would not automatically restore Second Amendment rights to all prohibited persons; state laws would still apply. But it would sharply constrain the federal government’s ability to police local firearm possession.
Gun-rights advocates view the case as a long-overdue examination of whether the federal government has claimed powers the Constitution never granted. Critics of expansive federal criminal law see potential for broader recalibration. Public-safety advocates and many federal prosecutors argue that weakening the commerce foundation of § 922(g) would undermine a primary tool used against violent offenders and repeat felons.
Looking Ahead
As of late July 2026, the Fifth Circuit has not yet scheduled oral argument or issued a new briefing calendar. Amicus participation is expected to be extensive, drawing briefs from the Solicitor General’s office, state attorneys general, Second Amendment organizations, criminal-defense groups, and scholars of constitutional structure.
Whatever the full court ultimately decides, United States v. Squire has already accomplished something rare: it has forced a serious judicial conversation about the outer boundaries of federal power over local conduct. A case that began with a handgun recovered during a New Orleans search warrant now sits at the intersection of the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the enduring debate over the proper scope of national authority in a federal system. The full Fifth Circuit’s forthcoming decision will determine whether that conversation remains confined to firearms or expands into a more fundamental reexamination of congressional power.