The Supreme Court Confrontation Over AR-15 Bans: Cook County and Connecticut’s Responses in the Consolidated Cases of Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins
On October 21, 2026, Cook County, Illinois, and the State of Connecticut filed their merits briefs in the consolidated Supreme Court cases Viramontes v. Cook County (No. 25-238) and Grant v. Higgins (No. 25-566). These filings mark a pivotal moment in one of the most significant Second Amendment disputes since District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022). The cases ask whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles. Oral argument is scheduled for December 2, 2026.
The respondents’ briefs seek to uphold longstanding local and state bans by arguing that AR-15-style rifles are “unusually dangerous” weapons subject to a historical tradition of regulation, and that widespread civilian ownership does not create a constitutional shield. These arguments directly confront the petitioners’ reliance on Heller’s “common use” principle and Bruen’s text-and-history framework. With tens of millions of AR-15-platform rifles in civilian hands nationwide, the outcome could reshape the scope of the right to keep and bear arms for a generation.
Origins of the Cases and the Path to Consolidation
Viramontes v. Cook County challenges a Cook County ordinance first enacted in 1993 and later amended. The ordinance prohibits the possession, acquisition, and transfer of “assault weapons,” defined to include more than 100 specifically named models (including AR-15 and AK-47 platform rifles) as well as any semiautomatic rifle capable of accepting a magazine holding more than ten rounds and featuring at least one listed characteristic such as a pistol grip, folding or telescoping stock, barrel shroud, or flash suppressor. Individual plaintiffs Cutberto Viramontes and Christopher Khaya, joined by the Firearms Policy Coalition and the Second Amendment Foundation, sued in 2021. They argued the ban prevents them from acquiring common rifles for lawful self-defense and other purposes. The district court granted summary judgment to the County; the Seventh Circuit affirmed in a nonprecedential order in June 2025, relying in part on its earlier decision in Bevis v. City of Naperville.
Grant v. Higgins challenges Connecticut’s post-Sandy Hook assault weapons law. Connecticut first restricted certain semiautomatic firearms in 1993. In 2013, following the December 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in which 20 children and six educators were killed with a Bushmaster XM15 (an AR-15-style rifle), the legislature expanded the ban. It added the AR-15 and related models by name and prohibited semiautomatic centerfire rifles that accept detachable magazines and possess one or more features including a folding or telescoping stock, pistol grip, forward pistol grip, flash suppressor, or grenade/flare launcher. Existing owners could obtain certificates of possession to keep previously owned firearms. Plaintiffs including Eddie Grant Jr., Jennifer Hamilton, Michael Stiefel, the Connecticut Citizens Defense League, and the Second Amendment Foundation sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied relief, and the Second Circuit affirmed in 2025, holding that the law targeted “unusually dangerous” weapons consistent with historical tradition.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 30, 2026, consolidating the cases for briefing and argument under the Viramontes docket and limiting review to the question presented in that petition. Petitioners filed their opening merits brief on August 28, 2026. The United States, through Solicitor General D. John Sauer, filed an amicus brief supporting the petitioners, arguing that AR-15-platform rifles are arms in common use for lawful purposes and that the bans are unconstitutional. Numerous other amici, including a coalition of 27 states, also supported the challengers. Respondents’ briefs followed on October 21.
The Legal Framework: Heller, Bruen, and the Common-Use Principle
Heller established that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess arms “in common use” for lawful purposes such as self-defense and that the right is not limited to militia service. The Court distinguished “dangerous and unusual” weapons that could be restricted. McDonald v. Chicago (2010) applied the right against the states. Bruen rejected means-end scrutiny and required that modern firearm regulations be consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation when the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the regulated conduct. United States v. Rahimi (2024) refined the analogical inquiry, confirming that historical analogues need not be exact twins but must share relevant principles.
Petitioners contend that AR-15-platform rifles are quintessential “arms,” overwhelmingly owned by law-abiding citizens for self-defense, hunting, sport, and other lawful purposes, and therefore protected under Heller’s common-use standard. Estimates of civilian ownership range from roughly 20–30 million AR-15-style rifles to higher figures when including similar semiautomatic platforms; one recent survey cited in related filings estimated approximately 60 million such rifles in the broader category. They argue no historical tradition supports banning an entire class of ordinary, commonly possessed semiautomatic rifles based on cosmetic or ergonomic features.
Respondents counter that common use is not determinative, that AR-15-style rifles are unusually dangerous by design, and that history supports regulating weapons of exceptional lethality even after they become popular.
Cook County’s Brief: Unusually Dangerous Weapons and Historical Tradition
Cook County’s 78-page brief, filed by State’s Attorney Eileen O’Neill Burke and her team, opens by describing the AR-15’s military origins. Developed in the late 1950s and adopted by the U.S. military as the M16, the civilian AR-15 shares core design features—including a pistol grip, detachable high-capacity magazines, and low-recoil .223/5.56mm ammunition that produces high-velocity projectiles capable of creating large wound cavities through yawing and fragmentation. The County emphasizes mass-casualty incidents, stating that seven of the eight deadliest attacks since September 11, 2001, involved AR-15-platform weapons and that 75 percent of shootings resulting in 20 or more deaths between 1991 and 2022 involved such rifles. It notes risks to law enforcement, including the ability to defeat soft body armor and outrange typical handguns.
Under Bruen, the County argues its ordinance fits within a robust historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons. It cites medieval English bans on the launcegay (a light lance banned in the late 14th century after use in murders and street violence), colonial prohibitions on trap guns (devices that fire without an operator present), 19th-century restrictions on Bowie knives (taxes, sales bans, and enhanced penalties in many states because of their lethality in personal combat), bans on slungshots (weighted impact weapons), and laws against going armed in a manner that terrifies the public or forming armed assemblies. The brief also references early 20th-century machinegun regulations culminating in the National Firearms Act of 1934. These analogues, the County contends, share the purpose of mitigating exceptional public danger while leaving other arms available for ordinary self-defense.
Cook County explicitly rejects the idea that popularity insulates a weapon: “Common Use Is Not Determinative of Constitutional Protection.” It distinguishes Heller’s step of determining whether an arm is protected from the subsequent historical-tradition analysis and notes that Heller itself permitted machinegun bans despite some civilian ownership. The brief asserts that AR-15s are not customarily used for self-defense in the home (describing them as heavy, long, and difficult to maneuver compared with handguns) and that their primary design purpose is military-style lethality. It leaves open the possibility that jurisdictions may differ in their approaches, stating that people are free to live where laws are more permissive, but the Constitution does not freeze regulation of unusually dangerous weapons.
Connecticut’s Brief: Rejecting the “Common-Use-Only” Test
Connecticut’s brief, filed by Attorney General William Tong and his team (with former Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar set to argue), is similarly structured around historical tradition and a frontal challenge to a “common-use-only” rule. The state recounts the Sandy Hook shooting and the 2013 bipartisan response that added AR-15s by name and expanded feature-based prohibitions. It describes AR-15s as optimized for sustained, rapid, accurate fire with low recoil, high velocity (roughly 3,200–3,300 feet per second), and the capacity for extended magazines, enabling unskilled shooters to inflict widespread damage at distance. The brief highlights disproportionate use in mass shootings and attacks on law enforcement while noting relatively rare use in documented self-defense incidents.
Connecticut argues that its ban is consistent with a centuries-long tradition of regulating weapons “unusually capable of causing death and destruction.” Historical examples span 14th-century English launcegay bans (citing a 1441 incident involving officers of the Archbishop of York), crossbow restrictions under the Tudors, proclamations against concealable “pocket dagges” and “steelets,” colonial trap-gun bans, 19th-century Bowie-knife and slungshot regulations (manufacture/sale bans in multiple states and carry prohibitions in others), and early automatic-weapon restrictions. The state contends these laws often targeted weapons that had become popular precisely because their dangers manifested in public violence.
The brief devotes substantial space to rebutting the petitioners’ common-use argument. It asserts that no historical source exempted weapons from regulation merely because they were widespread; to the contrary, popularity sometimes prompted bans once lethality became evident (Bowie knives, Tommy guns). Accepting a pure common-use test would create a “one-way ratchet” or “use-it-or-lose-it” rule that rewards manufacturers who flood the market before legislatures can act and penalizes deliberative responses after tragedies. Connecticut notes that the 1994 federal assault weapons ban expired in 2004, after which civilian ownership grew dramatically, and argues the Second Amendment does not freeze that development into permanent immunity. It further contends that Heller and later cases do not require legislatures to tolerate unusually dangerous arms simply because millions of law-abiding owners possess them.
Shared Themes, Distinctions, and Critiques
Both briefs emphasize that the Second Amendment is “not unlimited,” that AR-15s share functional characteristics with military rifles, and that bans leave ordinary handguns, shotguns, and non-featured rifles available. Both rely heavily on analogues involving Bowie knives, slungshots, trap guns, and earlier English weapons rather than on Founding-era or Reconstruction-era bans of ordinary civilian rifles. Both treat technological change—rapid, accurate, high-capacity firepower in a single operator’s hands—as creating unprecedented societal concerns analogous to earlier responses to new weapons.
Critics, including Second Amendment Foundation litigators and commentators, argue that the historical analogues are poorly matched. Many cited laws regulated public carry, sales, or specific misuse (trap guns that fire without an operator, weapons used to terrorize) rather than peaceful private possession of a class of arms. Launcegays and slungshots are obscure; Bowie-knife restrictions were often limited to concealed carry or sales taxes rather than total possession bans. The critics note that the Founders were well aware of technological progress (air rifles used by Lewis and Clark, rapid advances in science) and that Heller and Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016) protect arms not in existence at the Founding when they are in common civilian use. They contend that treating military resemblance as disqualifying would invert the militia purpose of the Second Amendment and open the door to bans on any effective rifle.
Petitioners and supporting amici emphasize ownership numbers, lawful uses (self-defense, competition, hunting where legal), and the absence of any historical tradition of banning ordinary repeating or semiautomatic rifles. The United States’ amicus brief reinforces that AR-15s are arms in common use.
Broader Implications
A decision upholding the bans would affirm that legislatures may prohibit entire categories of commonly owned semiautomatic rifles based on lethality assessments and historical analogues of varying specificity, potentially affecting similar laws in roughly a dozen states and certain localities. A decision for the petitioners would establish that AR-15-platform rifles are protected under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, likely invalidating feature-based and model-specific bans nationwide and clarifying the interaction between common use and historical tradition. Either outcome will influence related disputes over magazines, pistol braces, and other modern features. With argument set for December 2, 2026, and a decision expected by the end of the October 2026 Term, the consolidated cases will test whether Heller and Bruen protect the most popular rifle platform in America or permit governments to treat it as unusually dangerous and outside the core of the right.
The respondents’ briefs present a coherent theory: public safety concerns rooted in mass-casualty potential, military design heritage, and a claimed historical practice of regulating exceptional weapons can outweigh widespread civilian ownership. Whether the Court finds that theory consistent with its precedents will determine the practical scope of the Second Amendment for millions of Americans.