Richards v. Bonta: Challenging California’s 10-Day Firearm Waiting Period
California’s 10-day waiting period for firearm purchases forces law-abiding buyers to leave the store empty-handed even after the state has confirmed they are eligible to own a gun. Background checks often clear in minutes, yet possession is barred for at least ten full days. Richards v. Bonta, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, seeks to end that delay as an unconstitutional infringement of the Second Amendment under the Supreme Court’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen standard. The case tests whether a modern “cooling-off” rule with no founding-era analogue can survive text, history, and tradition analysis.
California’s Waiting Period Regime
California Penal Code sections 26815(a) and 27540(a) prohibit a licensed dealer from delivering a firearm within 10 days of the application to purchase. The rule applies to all firearms and covers both dealer sales and private-party transfers processed through a dealer. California first imposed waiting periods in the early twentieth century. A same-day prohibition on handgun delivery appeared in 1923; periods later expanded to three, five, and fifteen days before settling at the current ten-day standard for all firearms in the mid-1990s. The original legislative justifications centered on the time needed for manual background checks. Instant electronic checks later rendered that rationale largely obsolete, yet the mandatory delay remained and was defended as a “cooling-off” measure against impulsive acts.
A prior challenge, Silvester v. Harris, reached the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. A district court ruled the full ten-day period unconstitutional as applied to buyers who already owned firearms or held a concealed-carry license and who cleared their background check early. The Ninth Circuit reversed, applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding the delay as a reasonable safety precaution. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2018; Justice Thomas dissented, criticizing lower courts for treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right.
The Richards Lawsuit
On May 1, 2023, a coalition of individuals, gun stores, and advocacy organizations filed Richards v. Bonta (Case No. 3:23-cv-00793). Plaintiffs include the Firearms Policy Coalition, Second Amendment Foundation, California Gun Rights Foundation, San Diego County Gun Owners PAC, North County Shooting Center, PWGG, L.P., and several private citizens. Named plaintiff Claire Richards was later dismissed. Defendants are California Attorney General Rob Bonta and Bureau of Firearms Director Allison Mendoza, sued in their official capacities.
The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs argue that the waiting-period statutes prevent law-abiding people from taking possession of lawfully acquired firearms for immediate self-defense and other lawful purposes—even after the state knows the buyer is not prohibited. They contend the delay applies equally to first-time buyers and to people who already own multiple firearms or hold a carry license, rendering the “cooling-off” rationale especially weak in those circumstances. The core claim is that the statutes violate the Second Amendment as applied to individuals who pass a background check and are otherwise eligible.
Legal Arguments Under Bruen
Bruen requires courts to determine whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the regulated conduct and, if so, whether the government can show that its regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Plaintiffs argue the relevant conduct—taking possession of a purchased firearm once eligibility is confirmed—is covered by the Amendment’s protection of the right to keep and bear arms. They further argue that no historical analogue from the founding era or Reconstruction supports a mandatory multi-day delay between purchase approval and possession.
The first known waiting-period laws appeared in the 1920s, well outside the historical periods Bruen treats as most relevant. Plaintiffs emphasize that “a right delayed is a right denied.” Once the background check clears, the state has already determined the buyer may lawfully possess firearms; the additional waiting period functions as a temporary ban on possession of the specific arm the buyer has paid for. Organizations involved in the case have described the regime as relegating the Second Amendment to second-class status.
California has defended the laws as presumptively lawful commercial regulations or as consistent with historical principles of preventing dangerous individuals from acquiring arms. Cross-motions for summary judgment were briefed in 2024, with both sides arguing whether the waiting period implicates the Second Amendment’s text and whether any historical tradition supports it.
Procedural History and Current Status
After initial pleadings and discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in July and August 2024. In early 2025 the district court denied the motions without prejudice so the parties could address the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yukutake v. Lopez, a case involving Hawaii’s permit-to-purchase timing rules. The court later stayed Richards pending en banc review of Yukutake. As of October 16, 2026, the stay remains in effect while the parties await resolution of a related petition for certiorari. The court has ordered a joint status report within 15 days of that resolution, or by January 5, 2027, if no petition is filed. The case therefore remains pending, with no final merits ruling on the constitutionality of the ten-day period.
Broader Implications
Waiting periods exist in a minority of states, but California’s version is among the longest and most absolute. A ruling for the plaintiffs would not eliminate background checks; it would remove the fixed delay after eligibility is confirmed. That distinction matters for people who need a firearm for immediate self-defense—victims of domestic threats, for example—who already pass every legal hurdle the state imposes. It also matters for the principle that enumerated rights are not subject to arbitrary temporal conditions unsupported by history.
The case sits within a larger wave of post-Bruen challenges to California’s firearm regulations, alongside litigation over magazine capacity, ammunition background checks, and other restrictions. Outcomes in related Ninth Circuit cases continue to shape the briefing and timing in Richards. Regardless of the immediate result, the litigation underscores the continuing demand that courts apply the same historical test to waiting periods that Bruen requires for other firearm regulations.
Conclusion
Richards v. Bonta asks a straightforward question under current Second Amendment doctrine: once the government confirms a buyer is eligible to possess a firearm, may it still impose a ten-day ban on possession of that firearm solely because the buyer is a California resident? The plaintiffs argue that history supplies no justification for the delay and that the Second Amendment does not tolerate it. The case remains stayed pending related appellate developments, but the underlying dispute over California’s waiting period is far from resolved. For gun owners and dealers in the state, the outcome will determine whether the right to keep and bear arms can be exercised on the same day the state itself declares the buyer lawfully entitled to do so.